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Abstract
Empirical research in finance documented the existence of a permanent price impact asym-
metry between buyer and seller-initiated block trades: the permanent price impact of buys is
larger than that of sells. This paper develops a theoretical model to explain and investigate
the asymmetry phenomenon. The model formalizes an intuition that the dynamic trading
strategy of profit-maximizing institutional portfolio managers creates a difference between
the information content of buys and sells. It is this difference that causes the expected per-
manent price impact asymmetry. The model produces new empirical implications concerning
the relationship between the asymmetry phenomenon and the economic environment. The
main implication of the model is that the history of price performance influences the asym-
metry. The longer the run-up in a stock’s price, the less is the asymmetry. The greater the
trading intensity of institutional investors or the more informationally-active a stock, the
more pronounced is the asymmetry when a stock’s price has not been going up or is at the
beginning of a price run-up. The opposite result appears after a long period of (abnormal)
price appreciation.
Price Impact Asymmetry of Block Trades: An Institutional Trading Explanation
Empirical research on block transactions and institutional trades has produced a seem-
ingly puzzling result: markets react differently to buy and sell orders. Beginning with Kraus
and Stoll (1972), researchers have found that block purchases have a larger permanent price
impact than block sales (Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1987, 1990; Keim and Madha-
van, 1996; Gemmill, 1996). The same result was documented for institutional trades (Chan
and Lakonishok, 1993) and for institutional trade packages (Chan and Lakonishok, 1995).
While prices go up on buys and down on sells, they revert after sells but remain high after
buys, creating the permanent price impact asymmetry.
Two explanations appear in the literature to account for the permanent price impact of
block trades: inelastic demand and supply curves, and information effects. If a stock does
not have sufficiently close substitutes, the excess demand and supply curves for its shares
will not be perfectly elastic and block trades will have a permanent price impact. No obvious
story, however, can explain why the long-term elasticity of demand in a secondary market
should differ than that of supply. Hence, it is unclear why the permanent price impact
should depend on whether the initiator of a transaction was a buyer or a seller.1 On the
other hand, if informed traders are active in the market and their trading strategy makes
buy orders carry more information than sell orders, equilibrium prices should adjust more
for buys than for sells.
One possible reason for differences in the information content of trades is mentioned by
Chan and Lakonishok (1993): Since an institutional investor typically does not hold the
market portfolio, the choice of a particular issue to sell, out of the limited alternatives in a
1Short-run liquidity costs were used in the literature to explain the temporary impact of block trades.
Temporary asymmetry between buys and sells was attributed to the willingness of block positioning firms
to accommodate sales but not purchases (Kraus and Stoll, 1972), and to difficulty in locating potential
sellers as opposed to potential buyers (Chan and Lakonishok, 1993). Holthausen et al. (1987) report that
discussions with block traders suggest that they do in fact often accommodate block purchases. Analysis of
commissions by Keim and Madhavan (1994) suggests that differences in the cost of locating counter-parties
cannot explain the asymmetry in the price impact of buys and sells. While it may be that short-run liquidity
concerns affect the prices at which blocks trade, they cannot explain why the permanent price impact of
buys and sells differ.
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portfolio, does not necessarily convey negative information... As a result, there are many
liquidity-motivated reasons to dispose of a stock. In contrast, the choice of one specific issue
to buy, out of the numerous possibilities on the market, is likely to convey favorable firm-
specific news. (p. 185) Implicit in this argument are numerous assumptions about both the
set of feasible investment strategies that can be employed by mutual funds and their optimal
trading strategy. Without being specific about the underlying mechanism that generates
informational differences between buys and sells, we cannot hope to test the information
explanation. An investigation of the permanent price impact asymmetry therefore requires
setting forth a basic set of assumptions on the behavior of institutional investors, generating
informational differences between buys and sells, and relating them to other phenomena in
the market in order to produce new testable implications. The objective of this paper is to
pursue this line of investigation.
More specifically, I make four observations concerning the behavior and constraints of
mutual funds.2 First, they often devote substantial resources to gathering and analyzing
information. Second, most mutual funds limit their investment to money they receive from
shareholders (rather than borrow). Hence, investing in one stock has the opportunity cost
of not investing in another. Third, mutual funds do not concentrate their holdings in only a
few stocks. Fourth, mutual funds hold assets in non-negative amounts. In other words, they
seem to be averse to extensive usage of short sales. These four characteristics of institutional
behavior create a situation in which portfolio managers are predominantly engaged in search-
ing for stocks whose price is expected to rise. They re-balance their portfolios frequently to
sell stocks that do not fit this description.
I explicitly model an institutional dynamic trading strategy consistent with these four
observations. The model highlights the considerations of portfolio managers who are looking
to exploit information in a multiple-stock context and are subject to some constraints on
their allowable trading strategies. Their expected profit maximizing trading strategy involves
2The terms institutional investors and mutual funds are used in this paper interchangeably. A more
elaborate discussion of these observations (with references) is provided in Section 2.1.
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always searching for information about stocks already in their portfolios in order to sell stocks
whose price is expected to go down or on which there is no special information. Their search
for information continues among stocks not in their portfolios in order to buy stocks on which
they discover favorable information. If the market knows that institutional investors may
be informed about the prospects of stocks, such a dynamic re-balancing strategy creates a
difference between the information content of buys and sells.
I investigate how the behavior of institutional investors affects the market using a simple
intertemporal trading model. The expected permanent price impact of a block trade in the
model corresponds to the change in the market’s expectations of the true value of a stock
brought about by the block transaction. I derive an expression for the expected permanent
price impact asymmetry between buyer and seller-initiated block transactions and explore its
relationship with the economic environment. The model demonstrates how the price impact
asymmetry that was documented in the empirical studies can arise. More importantly, the
model produces new empirical implications concerning the influence of price performance,
institutional following, information intensity, and volatility on the asymmetry phenomenon.
The main implication of the model is that the history of price performance influences
the asymmetry. The longer the run-up in a stock’s price, the less is the asymmetry. In
fact, the model predicts no asymmetry or even negative asymmetry	sells having a larger
permanent price impact than buys	following a long (abnormal) price run-up. In addition,
past price performance affects the manner in which other elements of the economic environ-
ment relate to the asymmetry phenomenon. For example, the greater the trading intensity
of institutional investors, the more pronounced is the asymmetry when the stock’s price has
not been rising or when the stock is at the beginning of a price run-up. The opposite result
appears after a long period of (abnormal) price appreciation. A similar relationship also
exists between the frequency of information events concerning the stock and the asymmetry:
the more informationally-active a stock, the greater is the asymmetry if the stock’s price
has not been going up or is at the beginning of a series of price appreciations. The opposite
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result appears after a long price run-up. While the required return always increases the
asymmetry, greater dispersion of a stock’s price increases the asymmetry at the beginning
of a price run-up, but decreases it after a long period of price appreciation.
The implications of the model concerning the relation between the permanent price im-
pact asymmetry and the economic environment have not been tested by the empirical papers
that documented this phenomenon. Hence, they provide an opportunity to test the hypoth-
esis that the asymmetry phenomenon arises due to the behavior of institutional investors.
Previous theoretical models of block trades (e.g., Easley and O’Hara, 1987; Seppi, 1990) fo-
cus on the choice of traders over which trade size to use but make no attempt to explain the
price impact asymmetry. Other related papers are Bhattacharya and Krishnan (1999), who
explore how suspicion in capital markets may alleviate moral hazard in managerial disclosure
and produce a difference in the information content of buys and sells, and Allen and Gorton
(1992), who investigate market manipulation using exogenous asymmetry in the arrival rates
of uninformed buyers and sellers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 defines the permanent price impact
asymmetry. Section 2 describes the trading strategy of institutional investors and sets up
the trading model. Section 3 investigates the asymmetry phenomenon in this economy and
discusses the empirical implications. Section 4 is a conclusion.
1 Permanent Price Impact Asymmetry
The empirical literature on the price impact of block trades focuses on investigating three
basic prices: a proxy for the equilibrium price prior to the block trade (P e−1), the price at
which the block trade is executed (P T ), and a proxy for the equilibrium price following the
block trade (P e+1). The permanent price impact of a buyer-initiated block trade is defined
as ∆B =
P e+1−P e−1
P e−1
conditional on the execution of a block trade in the period bracketed
by these two equilibrium prices. Hence, the permanent price impact is not a function of
the block’s actual trading price. Instead, it is a random variable assumed to represent the
4
possible changes in equilibrium value conditional on the information that can be inferred
from the block. The fact that an investor wants to trade a block alters beliefs about the
value of the stock. If some investors possess private information and use it optimally, the
expected permanent price impact of a buyer-initiated block trade will most likely be positive.
In contrast, the expected permanent price impact of a seller-initiated block trade will be
negative. To make the comparison of magnitudes easier, the permanent price impact of a
seller-initiated block trade is defined as ∆S =
P e−1−P e+1
P e−1
. Hence, the expected price impact of
seller-initiated block trades is also positive.
A theoretical investigation of the price impact asymmetry requires more specific defini-
tions of the value process of stocks and the pre and post-trade equilibrium prices. There are
N stocks in the economy, each representing a claim to the assets of a firm. The true value of
stock i is defined as the discounted value of all future gains or losses of firm i. A bad event
on date t implies a loss of Zit (a strictly positive number) and occurs with probability δ
i. A
good event on date t implies a gain of the same magnitude, Zit , and occurs with probability
1−δi. Information about the gains or losses reaches the market with probability αi. On
dates without information, the market assumes that gains (or losses) are at their expected
value, (1−2δi)Zit .3 Private information is short lived and the nature of the information event
is revealed to all after the end of trading on date t. For the ease of exposition, each date will
be referred to as a day.4
The required return on each stock, ri, is the result of an equilibrium (or the absence of
arbitrage) along the lines of traditional asset pricing models. In other words, investors in
the market agree on the model for long term valuation of stocks. Every evening when all
investors have the same information set, they reach the same conclusions as to the values of
3This information structure is similar to the one used in Easley and O’Hara (1992) which includes event
uncertainty in addition to uncertainty with respect to the nature of the event.
4If one believes that relevant information arrives only once a week or once a month, one can simply
relabel the time intervals accordingly. What is important to the analysis is the discrete nature of information
arrival and that old information is completely revealed before new information arrives. This issue is further
discussed in Section 3.2.
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all stocks.5 Investors value each stock under the assumption that αi, δi, and ri are constant
for a finite horizon of T i days.6 Let Ft be the information set used by the market to value
stocks at the end of each day (i.e., Ft includes all parameters of the economy and past
realizations of the information events). Then, the true value of stock i on date t < T i is:
V it = (1 + r
i)tE
Ci0 + T i∑
s=1
eis
(1 + ri)s
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

where,
eit =

Zit with probability α
i(1-δi)
−Zit with probability αiδi
(1− 2δi)Zit with probability 1-αi
and the role of Ci0 is to capture accrual earnings, investment costs prior to date zero, and
the market’s best-effort assessment of the discounted value of future cash flows beyond T i.
Under this structure, the discounted true value process is a martingale with respect to Ft,
and the expression for the value of stock i can be rearranged to emphasize the change in
value over days:
V it = V
i
t−1(1 + r
i) + eit − (1− 2δi)Zit (1)
Expression (1) shows how in addition to the required return earned by the stock every
day, the stock’s value will go up by 2δiZit on days with good information events, go down
by 2(1− δi)Zit on days with bad information events, and stay the same on days without
information events.
The empirical papers mentioned in the introduction differ in terms of the proxies used
for the equilibrium prices. Following Kraus and Stoll (1972), I define P e−1 as the closing price
on day t−1. In the context of the model presented here, the actual price of the last trade
is not known for sure. Hence, P e−1 is taken to be the price after the close on day t−1, V it−1.
Similarly, the equilibrium price following the block transaction, P e+1, is defined as the price
after the close on day t, V it . Using these definitions, the permanent price impact of a block
5While the model that gives rise to the required return is not explicitly written down in this paper, it can
be thought of as one of the standard asset pricing models that describe a world of homogeneous information.
6T i is determined based on how strong are beliefs in the market that firm i will continue to perform
according to the current parameters.
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buy at the opening of the market on day t can be written as:
∆Bi =

V it−1(1+ri)+Zit−(1−2δi)Zit−V it−1
V it−1
= ri + 2δi Z
i
t
V it−1
w.p. P (H i|Ft−1, Bi)
V it−1(1+ri)−V it−1
V it−1
= ri w.p. P (Oi|Ft−1, Bi)
V it−1(1+ri)−Zit−(1−2δi)Zit−V it−1
V it−1
= ri − 2(1− δi) Zit
V it−1
w.p. P (Li|Ft−1, Bi)
(2)
where the events H i, Oi and Li represent good information, no information and bad infor-
mation, respectively, about firm i, and Bi in the conditioning information set represents
the arrival of a buy order for a block of firm i’s stock. The price impact of seller-initiated
blocks, ∆Si, can be derived in a similar fashion. Let the expected permanent price impact
asymmetry expression of stock i at the opening of the market on day t be defined as:
J it = E
[
∆Bi
∣∣Ft−1, Bi]− E [∆Si∣∣Ft−1, Si]
where Si in the conditioning information set represents a sell block trade. J it is positive, zero
or negative if and only if the expected permanent price impact of buyer-initiated block trades
is larger than, equal to or smaller than that of seller-initiated block trades, respectively.
Note that while the unconditional increase or decrease in the value of a stock over a day
can be symmetric, the arrival of a block trade provides information and hence the resulting
conditional distribution may be skewed in one direction or the other. The empirical literature
investigating the price impact of blocks conditions on the execution of these trades and then
looks at the changes in the proxies for equilibrium prices. Similarly, I condition on the arrival
of a block trade and then ask what is the expected change in the value of the stock. If
the magnitude of the expected change in value conditional on the arrival of a buy block is
greater than that magnitude conditional on the arrival of a sell block (as documented by the
empirical papers), the asymmetry expression will be positive.
Following Easley and O’Hara (1987), I define δit(B) as:
δit(B) = P (L
i|Ft−1, Bi) + δiP (Oi|Ft−1, Bi) (3)
Hence, δit(B) is the probability that the true value of the stock reflects a loss on date t
conditional on the arrival of a block buy, whether or not information about the loss arrives
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in the market. δit(S) can be defined in a analogous manner. Plugging ∆B
i and ∆Si into the
permanent price impact asymmetry expression and using the definitions of δit(B) and δ
i
t(S)
yields:
J it = 2
Zit
V it−1
[δi − δit(B) + δi − δit(S)] + 2ri (4)
The asymmetry expression in (4) is comprised of two separate effects. The first term of
the expression is the difference between the information content of buys and sells. [δi −
δit(B)] can be thought of as a distance between the prior probability (for the day) and
the posterior probability (conditional on observing a block buy) of a loss. The more (good)
private information is associated with a buy, the smaller is δit(B), and the larger is the
distance between the prior and the posterior. Similarly, [δi−δit(S)] is the negative distance
between the prior probability (for the day) and the posterior probability (conditional on
observing a block sell) of a loss. The more (bad) private information is associated with
a sell, the larger is δit(S), and the more negative is the distance between the prior and
the posterior. Hence, heuristically, if buys contain more information than sells, the first
distance dominates the term and the information effect gives rise to a positive asymmetry.
If sells contain more information than buys, the second distance dominates the term and
the information effect is negative.
The second term of expression (4) is the required return	the time value of money ad-
justed for risk. If investors expect a positive return on their investment, prices (cum dividend)
will move up on average regardless of the trades that arrive in the market. This effect,
however, can be small for short time intervals. Nonetheless, stocks with more systematic
risk would ceteris paribus exhibit a larger permanent price impact asymmetry between buys
and sells. Most empirical papers that documented the permanent price impact asymmetry
controlled using various methods for the effect of the required return. Hence, the key to un-
derstanding the permanent price impact asymmetry lies in understanding the information
term of J it .
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2 The Market
2.1 Institutional Investors
There are four observations about the manner in which institutional investors behave that
are central to modeling their dynamic trading strategy. While not all mutual funds behave
according to them, many operate in a manner consistent with these observations. Hence,
these observations can be viewed as describing a prototypical mutual fund. The first
observation is that institutional investors devote substantial resources to the tasks of gath-
ering and analyzing information. Portfolio managers make investment decisions based on
predictions and recommendations produced by research departments.7 Also, it is no longer
considered sufficient for analysts to determine the long-term prospects of firms. Reports in
the popular press claim that predicting the short term movements of stocks is viewed as
central to the analyst’s job description.8 I model this observation by allowing institutions
to invest in building a research infrastructure. This enables them to follow certain stocks
that fit their preferred investment profile or that offer a cost advantage with respect to in-
formation gathering. Let Gj be the set of stocks followed by institutional investor j. For
each stock i in Gj, the research department of the institution has determined that the cost of
finding private information on the stock is not greater than the expected profit from knowing
the private information.9
The second observation is that mutual funds primarily invest money received from share-
holders. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) limits the ability of mutual funds
to use leverage.10 Even more importantly, many mutual funds place restrictions on using
leverage in their charters. Reports in the popular press indicate that the investment style of
mutual funds’ portfolio managers is indeed shaped by these restrictions.11 The investment
7Mutual funds that do not have their own in-house research infrastructure pay substantial amounts in
commissions to sell side institutions in exchange for research and analysis.
8See, for example, Joseph Nocera, Who really moves the market? Fortune Magazine, October 27, 1997.
9Each institutional investor may have its own cost advantage in different industries and so the set Gj
depends on characteristics of the institutional investor that are not modeled explicitly.
10See Investment Company Act (1940) 80a-18 and Investment Company Act Release No. 7221 (1972).
11Bill Barnhart, Investing in Mutual Funds, Chicago Tribune, July, 27, 1997.
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of limited sums of money creates the notion of an opportunity cost: money invested in one
stock cannot be used to invest in another stock. To model this observation, each institutional
investor is assumed to manage a portfolio with a certain number of stocks without the ability
to borrow money in order to invest in more stocks. The number of stocks held by a mutual
fund (and hence its size) can change due to trading profit, cash inflows and outflows, and
dividends the mutual fund pays to its shareholders.
The third observation is that mutual funds hold relatively diversified portfolios consisting
of many stocks. A mutual fund will not invest a large portion of its money in one stock, as
such behavior will be hard to justify to shareholders (many of whom invest in mutual funds
with the explicit objective of diversifying their holdings). Moreover, SEC rules that apply to
most mutual funds limit the percentage holding of any one stock and hence de facto require
diversification.12 In order to model the notion that mutual funds do not concentrate on only
a few stocks and that the trades modeled here are large (i.e., block trades), I assume that
a mutual fund’s holding of a stock is equivalent to a block trade. This assumption will be
referred to as the diversification constraint.13
The fourth observation is that most mutual funds hold stocks in non-negative amounts.14
Most mutual funds do not sell short as a matter of policy because it involves the risk of
unlimited losses if the stock price goes up, and the charters of many mutual funds explicitly
restrict the usage of short sales.15 Sharpe (1991) notes that some of this aversion is due to the
implicit threat of suit for violation of fiduciary standards. The regulatory environment also
takes part in discouraging short sales on the part of mutual funds. The SEC limits the amount
of short sales a mutual fund can undertake (see Investment Company Act Release 7221
(1972)), and there are additional regulatory constraints on short selling (the up-tick rule)
12See Investment Company Act (1940) and Investment Company Act Release No. 7221 (1972).
13This constraint can be somewhat relaxed at the cost of additional complexity but without materially
affecting the results. Institutional investors may hold multiple blocks of the same stock as long as they are
increasingly averse to loading more of the same stock.
14See Falkenstein (1996).
15Randall Smith, Big-block trading pits institutions, dealers in a fast, tough game, The Wall Street
Journal, February 20, 1985.
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and on profit from short selling (the short-short rule). The end result is that institutions
are looking for stocks to hold and not stocks to sell short. The restriction on short sales
is imposed on mutual funds in this paper in a manner that resembles the true situation in
the market. Unlike in Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), there is no fraction of sales that
is arbitrarily assumed to be short sales. Instead, a mutual fund is prevented from selling
a stock only when this stock is not in its portfolio. Hence, any inference on institutional
trades will necessitate assessing the probability that a stock is in the portfolios of mutual
funds. While a simple restriction on sells always creates an asymmetry, the true short sale
constraint in this model allows for no asymmetry and even negative asymmetry (sells having
a larger price impact than buys).
These four observations	the constant search for information, the investment of specific
amounts, the holding of diversified portfolios, and the aversion to short selling	shape the
optimal investment strategy of institutional investors.16 What should a mutual fund do in
order to maximize expected profit? A simple buy and hold strategy will earn on average
the required return on each stock. An uninformed dynamic strategy will do even worse
(on average), since it involves transaction costs (e.g., the bid-ask spread) with no expected
gain. Having the ability to search and trade on the basis of information, an institutional
investor can hope to do better. Let Pjt be the portfolio held by institutional investor j at the
beginning of day t (before any re-balancing), and consider the following trading strategy:
Step 1 Search for information on all stocks in Pjt .
Step 2 Sell all stocks in Pjt with bad information events.
Step 3 Search among stocks in Gj \Pjt for stocks with good information events. Buy the stocks
you find until you replace all the stocks sold and use whatever money that was carried
16One can wonder whether the emergence of hedge funds (that presumably face fewer constraints than
mutual funds) has affected the information content of trades and the permanent price impact asymmetry.
Since the amount of assets under mutual funds’ management is much larger than the amount managed by
hedge funds, it may be reasonable to conjecture that the trading strategies of mutual funds exert a larger
influence on the information content of the order flow. Empirical work can be used to shed light on this
issue.
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forward from previous days (if you exhaust all stocks in that set, hold money and skip
Step 4).
Step 4 Continue to search in Gj \Pjt for stocks with good information events. Upon finding
such stocks, sell stocks in Pjt with no information events and replace them with good
information event stocks (continue until you replace all stocks with no information
events in Pjt , or until you exhaust searching all stocks in Gj \Pjt , whichever comes
first).17
The essence of this trading strategy is that portfolio managers rebalance their portfolios
often to sell stocks that are viewed as going down or not moving anywhere and replace them
with stocks on which they discover good information.18 This strategy is consistent with all
four assumptions about the behavior of institutional investors, but is it profit maximizing?
The answer to this question must depend on the cost of information in the economy and
the manner in which market makers set prices. It is possible to derive a set of sufficient
conditions for this trading strategy to be expected profit maximizing among all allowable
trading strategies (where allowable strategies are those in which a mutual fund invests in a
portfolio of stocks without borrowing or short selling).19 This set of sufficient conditions can
be interpreted to characterize a world in which (i) information costs are not too high (i.e.,
the cost associated with searching for information on the gain or loss on any given date is
low), (ii) the mutual funds’ optimal search for stocks with good information events is not
too lengthy (i.e., they do not spend too much money in the optimal search before finding
17This step is only carried out if there are good information event stocks in Gj \Pjt . Otherwise, it is
never profitable to sell stocks with no information events since holding them earns the required return while
replacing them entails trading costs (in the form of the bid-ask spread) while the newly purchased stocks
can also earn at most the required return.
18The popular press attributes the high turnover of stocks in the portfolios of mutual funds to the constant
search for winning stocks (see Michael Blumstein, How the Institutions Rule the Market, The New York
Times, November 25, 1984). The average turnover rate of stocks in the portfolios of mutual funds in 1996
was 91 percent (Jane Bryant Quinn, Trading Away the Strength of Mutual Funds, The Washington Post,
September, 28, 1997).
19A derivation of these sufficient conditions appeared in a previous version of this paper. The derivation
assumes that institutions use their experience to perform an optimal search among the stocks in Gj and
that prices are set by risk neutral and competitive market makers. The assumptions on the behavior of the
market makers are similar to those in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992).
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a good stock), and (iii) information is not impounded into prices too quickly (i.e., there
is enough uninformed trading). The first two conditions constitute a requirement on the
research technology of institutions whereby the process of finding stocks in which to invest
is not too costly. The last condition is a requirement on the trading environment: without
a sufficient number of uninformed investors, spreads will be very wide (see also Glosten and
Milgrom (1985)) and therefore transactions costs will make this dynamic trading strategy
unprofitable.
The first observation about the behavior of mutual funds is that they constantly search
for information about stocks. This behavior would not make sense if information costs or
the costs of the optimal search in the real world were too great. Hence, I will assume in
the rest of the paper that institutional investors in the market follow this trading strategy.20
Note that this trading strategy implicitly assumes that institutional investors would rather
hold cash than buy stocks on which they have no information. Another implicit assumption
is that mutual funds can always meet redemption needs by selling stocks that experience
either bad information or no information events. In other words, they will not sell stocks on
which they discover good information. If mutual funds in the real world behave sometimes
in a manner that violates these assumptions, the trading strategy described here can be
viewed as an approximation of the one actually employed by mutual funds. Controlling for
noise that may be introduced by these implicit assumptions is important for empirical tests
of the model. This point is further discussed in Section 3.2. In the spirit of the quote from
Chan and Lakonishok (1993), I will also make the simplifying assumption that the number
of stocks about which a mutual fund can collect information (i.e., the cardinality of Gj) is
large relative to the number of stocks in the mutual fund’s portfolio. Hence, there will be
enough stocks with good information events in the universe of stocks followed by a mutual
fund to replace all stocks with bad information and no information events in its portfolio.
20Transactions costs (beyond the information-asymmetry-driven bid-ask spread that is determined endoge-
nously) could make Step 4 of the trading strategy (selling stocks that are not moving to buy stocks that will
go up) less profitable. It can be shown that if mutual funds carry out only steps 1 through 3 of the trading
strategy, the results in Section 3.1 remain intact though the magnitude of the effects may be smaller.
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This assumption is not necessary for deriving the results in Section 3.1, but it simplifies the
presentation considerably.
2.2 Uninformed Traders
The economy is also populated by uninformed traders. They are called uninformed since
they do not know the realization of the gain or loss of a firm during the trading day, but
rather discover it when the information is publicly revealed at night. The identity of the
uninformed traders is by default all traders who are not information-intensive institutional
investors. Some institutional investors in the real world, like index funds, fit the characteri-
zation of uninformed traders. Individuals and portfolio managers who believe they have real
information but in fact trade on pure noise satisfy the description of uninformed traders as
well. If inflows or outflows of money create a situation in which portfolio managers of mutual
funds feel they have to buy or sell stocks without the support of research, these transactions
will be part of the uninformed order flow.21 This paper does not differentiate buys from sells
on non-informational (e.g., liquidity) grounds. Hence, uninformed traders are assumed to
buy or sell with equal probabilities.
For the sake of parsimony, I model only uninformed block trading. The model can be
easily extended to include small uninformed trades.22 This extension produces practically
identical results to those presented here. Easley and O’Hara (1987) use a sequential trade
model with two sizes of trades to investigate whether informed traders will use both small
and large trades. They show that if a large trade is large enough relative to a small
trade, a separating equilibrium prevails in which the informed traders use only large trades.
Since block trades are indeed much larger than small trades, it is reasonable to assume the
existence of such a separating equilibrium in the market modeled here as well.23 Hence, I
21The trading strategy of institutional investors in Section 2.1 can therefore be viewed as describing only
a part of the trading strategy of an institution	the part that is based on information.
22The parameters of such an extension can then be set to reflect the fact that block trades are indeed not
as common as small trades.
23The equilibrium condition used by Easley and O’Hara to generate their result is simply that the profit
of an informed trader from using a large trade (i.e., the number of shares times the difference between the
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abstract from the issue of small trades and focus on the interaction in the market for blocks.
Also for parsimony, the arrival of uninformed traders to the market is assumed rather
than derived from a larger set of investment strategies. Note, however, that if we let unin-
formed investors choose between investing through mutual funds and arriving to the market
separately, they will arrive to the market only if they are indifferent between these two
strategies. Therefore, any profit made by mutual funds as a result of trading on information
(beyond the required return) should be exhausted by the cost of maintaining the research
infrastructure and searching for information.24 Uninformed investors who choose to invest
through mutual funds would ultimately bare the cost of the information gathering activity
as part of the management fees and hence would not be making excess returns.25 Therefore,
the existence of uninformed traders in the market alongside informed mutual funds can be
consistent with a more elaborate model in which the investment strategy of the uninformed
traders is endogenized.
2.3 The Trading Model
Every day is divided into L trading periods. Each period allows for at most one trade. Most
stock exchanges in the world have a mechanism and a set of procedures that facilitate the
execution of individual orders. This mechanism can take the form of a specialist (NYSE),
multiple dealers (NASDAQ), an electronic limit order book (the Paris Bourse), and so on.
Since the permanent price impact of a trade is not affected by the actual price paid for the
transaction price and the equilibrium value of the stock) is greater than her profit from using a small trade.
Setting up the appropriate equilibrium condition in my model is more involved since an institution’s profit
depends on its entire trading strategy (that includes buying, holding, and selling the stock depending on the
information events and the portfolio position). Nonetheless, the equilibrium condition is influenced by the
same forces as in the Easley and O’Hara model (basically the number of shares in a trade versus the price
impact of the trade) and hence a similar intuition should generate the separating equilibrium.
24A previous version of this paper presented an equilibrium condition where the expected trading profit of
an institutional investor was set equal to the expected information gathering costs. For some recent evidence
of this competitive market for information see John Waggoner, Mutual Funds Bid Up Pay of Senior Stock
Analysts, USA Today, February 11, 1997; Charles Gasparino, Mutual Funds Show Managers The Money,
Seeking Big Returns, Wall Street Journal, March 7, 1997.
25This property ties into the extensive literature on the performance of mutual funds. While some papers
find that mutual funds trade as if they have information, it does not appear that they can deliver better
performance than some benchmarks, especially after management costs are taken into consideration. For a
recent review of this literature see Grinblatt and Titman (1995).
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shares, I need not be specific about the manner in which prices are set in this economy.
The only assumption I am making is that trading is anonymous: observing an order does
not reveal to the market the identity of the trader (i.e., whether it comes from an informed
institutional investor or an uninformed trader). Hence, the market cannot separate institu-
tional investors from uninformed traders and has to resort to probabilistic inference on the
information content of any particular order.
The probability that an institutional investor that follows stock i arrives in the market
at any period during the day is given by νi. Since each trading period can accommodate
only one trader, the probability that an uninformed investor arrives to the market is 1−νi.
If a mutual fund that follows stock i arrives in the market on date t, the probability that
it will buy or sell stock i depends on the nature of the information event about the stock
and whether the stock is in the mutual fund’s portfolio. When the stock is in its portfolio
and a good information event takes place, the mutual fund cannot load more of the stock
due to the diversification constraint. If bad information or no information events occur, the
mutual fund can sell the stock since the short sale constraint is not binding. When the stock
is not in its portfolio and bad information or no information events occur, the mutual fund
cannot sell the stock since the short sale constraint is binding. If a good information event
takes place, the mutual fund can buy the stock since the diversification constraint is not
binding. Whether the mutual fund in fact buys the stock depends on whether it searched
for information on that particular stock on that day. A priori, therefore, the diversification
constraint works to limit informed buys and the short sale constraint works to limit informed
sells. The degree to which these constraints are expected to bind the trading of informed
institutional investors is the key to understanding the price impact asymmetry of trades.
Define Ωit ∈ [0, 1) to be the market’s assessment of the probability that a mutual fund
will search for information about stock i on date t if the stock had a good information event
day and is not in the mutual fund’s portfolio.26 Denote the probability that a stock is in the
26Ωit is strictly less than one since it is possible that all stocks in the portfolio of an institution will have
good information events, in which case the institution will not search for information on any additional stock.
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portfolio of an institutional investor by γit,q. The subscript q (for stock i on date t) is the
length of the current run of good information event days that is known to the market, or the
number of consecutive days in which stock i had good information events up to date t−1. For
example, q=0 means that there was either a bad information event or a no information event
on date t−1. Given the trading strategy of mutual funds, stock i cannot be in the portfolio
of a mutual fund on date t since it would have been sold at t−1 if it was in the portfolio
then and would not have been bought otherwise. Hence, to calculate the probability that
stock i is in the portfolio of a mutual fund on date t we need not consider the entire history
of information events, but rather only what has happened from the beginning of the current
run of good information events.
Since a mutual fund will buy a stock only once during any given run of good information
events (due to the diversification constraint), and will not sell that stock until the run ends,
the probability that stock i is in the portfolio of a mutual fund that arrives in the market
equals the probability that stock i was bought by the mutual fund in all previous days during
the current run. More specifically,
γit,0 = 0
γit,1 = Ω
i
t−1(1− γit−1,0) = Ωit−1
γit,2 = Ω
i
t−2(1− γit−2,0) + Ωit−1(1− γit−1,1) = Ωit−1 + Ωit−2(1− Ωit−1)
...
...
γit,q =
∑q
p=1Ω
i
t−p(1− γit−p,q−p)
Fixing t, γit,q is increasing in q (since we are adding non-negative terms to the expression).
The trading probabilities and the associated trading outcomes are depicted in Figure 1.
On a bad information event day, an institutional investor will sell a block with probability
γit,q. With probability 1−γit,q, the stock is not in its portfolio and so the short sale constraint
is binding and the institution does not trade in stock i. On a good information event day,
an institutional investor will buy if the stock is not in its portfolio and if it searched for
information on the stock. Since these events are independent (due to the independence of
information events across days), the institution will therefore buy a block with probability
Ωit(1 − γit,q). Otherwise, it does not trade in stock i. On a no information event day, an
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institutional investor sells if the stock is in its portfolio (with probability γit,q) and otherwise
does not trade in stock i.
3 Properties of the Price Impact Asymmetry
The expected permanent price impact asymmetry expression in (4) can be generalized to
apply to each of the l ≤ L periods in a day by adding the sequence of trades from the
beginning of the day to the conditioning information set. Let Ql be the sequence of realized
trading outcomes up to and including period l. The generalized asymmetry expression for
period l+1 will be:

J it,l+1 = 2
Zit
V it−1
[δi − δit(Ql, B) + δi − δit(Ql, S)] + 2ri (5)
where the market uses Bayes rule to calculate δit(Q
l, B) and δit(Q
l, S).27 Given any arbitrary
history of trading outcomes Ql, the arrival of a block trade in period l+1 causes the market
to update its expectation of the percentage change in the equilibrium value of the stock (i.e.,
today’s true value relative to yesterday’s true value). The revision in expectations reflects
the information content of the block and results in a permanent price impact. Plugging the
probabilities from the trading model into expression (5), the asymmetry expression becomes:

J it,(b,s,n) = 2r
i + 2 Z
i
t
V it−1
αiδi(1− δi)· [1+ 2νiΩit(1−γit,q)1−νi ]b+1[ 1−νi)2νiγit,q+1−νi ]s[ 1−Ωit(1−γit,q)1−γit,q ]n−1
1−αi(1−δi)+αi(1−δi)
[
1+
2νiΩit(1−γit,q)
1−νi
]b+1[
1−νi)
2νiγit,q+1−νi
]s[ 1−Ωit(1−γit,q)
1−γit,q
]n
+
[
1+
2νiΩit(1−γit,q)
1−νi
]b[
1−νi)
2νiγit,q+1−νi
]s+1[
1−Ωit(1−γit,q)
1−γit,q
]n
−1
1−αi(1−δi)+αi(1−δi)
[
1+
2νiΩit(1−γit,q)
1−νi
]b[
1−νi)
2νiγit,q+1−νi
]s+1[ 1−Ωit(1−γit,q)
1−γit,q
]n

(6)
27Let ψit be the information event on day t, and Qs be the trading outcome in period s ≤ l. Then, one can
use the independence of trade arrival when conditioning on the type of information event and the similarity
in the trading strategies of institutions on no information event and bad information event days to write
δit(Q
l, B) and δit(Q
l, S) as follows:
δit(Q
l, B) = δi
∏l
s=1 P (Qs|ψit=L)P (B|ψit=L)∑
ψit
P (ψit)
∏l
s=1 P (Qs|ψit)P (B|ψit)
δit(Q
l, S) = δi
∏l
s=1 P (Qs|ψit=L)P (S|ψit=L)∑
ψit
P (ψit)
∏l
s=1 P (Qs|ψit)P (S|ψit)
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where b, s, and n are the number of buy blocks, sell blocks, and no trade outcomes in Ql,
respectively.28
The discussion in Section 2.3 emphasizes how the asymmetry in the information content of
trades is driven by differences in the portfolio positions of institutional investors across days.
Hence, different intra-day realizations of the vector (b, s, n) are of secondary importance.
In other words, to investigate the influence of institutional investors we should fix a vector
(b¯, s¯, n¯), and look at how differences in γit,q affect the asymmetry and how they interact with
the other parameters of the model. For simplicity, I fix the vector at (0, 0, 0) and examine
the price impact asymmetry expression after the opening of the market every day. Plugging
(0, 0, 0) into expression (6) yields:29
J it = 2
Zit
V it−1
αiδi(1− δi)νi
[
Ωi(1− γit,q)
αi(1− δi)νiΩit(1− γit,q) + 12(1− νi)
− γ
i
t,q
[1− αi(1− δi)]νiγit,q + 12(1− νi)
]
+ 2ri (7)
The above expression can now be used to analyze the relation between the expected perma-
nent price impact asymmetry and the economic environment.
3.1 Results
The first two results focus on the major importance of conditioning on past price performance
of a stock in understanding the expected permanent price impact asymmetry.
Result 1 The asymmetry expression of a stock that did not experience a signicant price
appreciation in the previous day is always strictly positive.
28This form of the expression is valid for any finite q (i.e., γit,q 6=1).
29One can go directly from (4) to (7) by noting that δit(B) and δ
i
t(S) at the opening of the market can be
written as:
δit(B) = δ
i
[
1
2 (1− νi)
αi(1− δi)νiΩit(1− γit,q) + 12 (1− νi)
]
δit(S) = δ
i
[
νiγit,q +
1
2 (1− νi)
[1− αi(1− δi)]νiγit,q + 12 (1− νi)
]
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Result 2 The longer the run of price appreciations a stock experiences (the larger q), the
smaller is the price impact asymmetry expression.
Proofs of all the results in this section can be found in the Appendix. For low q (and
especially for q=0), the probability that any institutional investor owns a block of the stock
is low. Hence, it is unlikely that the diversification constraint is binding on a typical
mutual fund that follows stock i, but the short sale constraint is most likely binding. In this
case, good information about the stock may prompt many mutual funds to buy it, resulting
in a high probability of an informed buy. Since most mutual funds do not own the stock,
they cannot sell it on a bad information event day, and hence the probability of an informed
sell is low. This creates a positive permanent price impact asymmetry.
As q increases and the stock price goes up, more mutual funds buy the stock. After a
long period of abnormal price appreciation (above and beyond the required return), which
is equivalent to saying that q is large, the probability that a stock is in an institutional
portfolio is also high. A mutual fund that has the stock in its portfolio will not buy more
blocks of the same stock and hence the probability of an informed buy decreases. On the
other hand, since many mutual funds own the stock, the short sell constraint is not binding
and bad information will result in informed sells. Hence, the probability of an informed sell
increases. This effect makes the asymmetry expression less and less positive. If the stock
price has been going up for a sufficiently long period, we may even see a negative asymmetry
expression. Still, the probability of a large q is very small and hence the implications of
the model are consistent with the empirical findings of positive asymmetry. For example, a
stock with αi=0.5 and δi=0.35 will have q=0 with probability 0.675, q=1 with probability
0.219, q=2 with probability 0.071, and q≥3 with probability of only 0.034. Whether J it will
be positive or negative for q≥1 depends on the values of the parameters of the stock.
Results 1 and 2 imply that stocks which generate more and shorter runs (e.g., with
αi(1 − δi) ≈ 1
2
) will have on average more days with low q, and hence will more often
exhibit a large permanent price impact asymmetry. Note, however, that q is always known.
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Hence, analyzing the influence of the other fundamentals of the economy on the asymmetry
expression will be done taking q as given and conditioning on a stock being at a particular
point in the run of good information events.
Result 3 When a stock's price has not been rising or is at the beginning of a good run, the
greater the trading intensity of institutional investors (the larger νi), the larger is the asym-
metry expression. For suciently large q, the greater the trading intensity of institutional
investors, the smaller is the price impact asymmetry expression.
What affects the price impact asymmetry most at the beginning of a good run is the
probability of an informed buy. The greater the trading intensity of institutional investors,
the more informed buy orders will arrive in the market, and hence the larger the price impact
asymmetry. As the number of consecutive price appreciations increases, the probability that
the stock is in an institutional portfolio increases as well. When the good run ends, having
more institutional trading means more informed sells. Hence, the larger νi, the less positive
is the price impact asymmetry expression for a large enough q.
Result 4 When a stock's price has not been rising or is at the beginning of a good run, the
more informationally-active a stock (the higher αi), the larger is the asymmetry expression.
For suciently large q, the more informationally-active a stock, the smaller is the price
impact asymmetry expression.
The more information events, the higher the probability that there was a good information
event and so it is more likely that a buy is informed. At the same time, the probability of
bad information events increases as well. For low q, the increase in the probability of an
informed buy is larger than the increase in the probability of an informed sell (especially for
q=0 when sells cannot be informed). For very large q, the opposite result occurs since sells
are more likely to be informed than buys.30
30The parameter δi affects both the distribution of good and bad information events and the magnitude
of the price impact of blocks. For example, an increase in the probability of a bad information event
21
Result 5 When a stock's price has not been rising or is at the beginning of a good run, the
greater the stock's price dispersion, the larger is the asymmetry expression. For suciently
large q, the greater the stock's price dispersion, the smaller is the asymmetry expression.
In general, a block trade will have a larger price impact the greater the dispersion of the
value process of a stock. If the information term of the asymmetry expression is positive,
greater dispersion will make the asymmetry even more positive. If, due to being far into
the run of good information events, the information term of the asymmetry expression is
negative, greater dispersion will make the asymmetry expression less positive by increasing
the influence of the negative information term.
3.2 Discussion of the Empirical Implications
The advantage of looking at the behavior of institutional investors to explain the permanent
price impact asymmetry lies in the additional insights that come out of the model. While
the model indeed shows how a positive asymmetry expression can arise, it goes further to
detail the influence of elements in the economic environment on the asymmetry. Testing the
model is therefore equivalent to testing these additional implications. In fact, the ability of
the model to produce no asymmetry and even negative asymmetry in certain circumstances
can be very important in constructing further investigations of this phenomenon.
The main insight that comes out of the model is the relation between the history of price
performance and the expected permanent price impact asymmetry. Block trades during
periods of poor price performance or little price appreciation should exhibit stronger positive
asymmetry. Block trades that come after a long price run-up should exhibit less asymmetry
(δi) is accompanied by a decrease in the magnitude of the price impact on a bad information event day
(2(1−δi) Zit
V it−1
). Since the expected price impact asymmetry is the sum of probabilities multiplied by changes
in value, we would expect to have a non-monotone relationship between the expected permanent price impact
asymmetry and δi even after conditioning on q. For example, it can be shown that when q=0, there is a
unique value of δi that is strictly between zero and one that maximizes the asymmetry expression. On the
other hand, when q is very large and the entire asymmetry expression is negative, maximizing it is equivalent
to eliminating uncertainty in the economy by setting δi to either zero or one. For any intermediate q, the
value of δi that maximizes the expression depends on the other parameters of the stock.
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or even negative asymmetry. Note that testing this prediction requires one to specify the
length of the period over which price performance is measured.
To make the model more parsimonious, I use a single time interval	a day	for three
different purposes. First, it is the interval between the pre and post-equilibrium prices that
are used to evaluate the price impact of blocks. Second, it is the horizon for creation and
revelation of private information. Third, it is the period over which institutional investors re-
balance their portfolios. The model, however, can be used to derive asymmetry expressions
for many different specifications of the equilibrium prices (e.g., the prices of the trades
before and after the block transaction). The ability to accomodate (though at the cost of
additional complexity) separate periods for the measurement of price impact and the creation
of information (or portfolio re-balancing) provides some flexibility to the empirical analysis.
For example, the length of time over which to measure the asymmetry can be one day, but
it can also be shorter (a few trades before and after the block) if one believes that prices in
the market adjust very quickly to the information content of blocks. On the other hand, the
period over which an information event takes place or an institutional investor re-balances
its portfolio may in fact be longer than a day (or even a month).
Another important issue is the choice of trades to represent the blocks analyzed in the
model. Since the model identifies the cause of the asymmetry with institutional behavior,
one can adopt the view that all institutional trades should exhibit this asymmetry. Including
medium-size trades in the analysis (usually defined as 1,00010,000 shares) may increase
the sample size considerably. However, including medium-size trades in the sample may
increase the noise as smaller trades may be motivated by various reasons not considered in
the theoretical analysis. Since previous empirical studies concluded that larger trades contain
more private information than smaller trades (Seppi, 1992; Madhavan and Cheng, 1997;
Lynch Koski and Michaely, 1997), an alternative approach would be to limit the analysis to
larger trades (blocks) in an attempt to reduce the noise.31 Whichever approach one takes,
31The findings of Lightfoot, Martin, Peterson, and Sirri (1997) using order data (rather than trade data)
also suggest that the information content of orders is monotonically increasing with size.
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it may be worthwhile to exclude very large blocks from the analysis. Since very large blocks
are usually traded in the upstairs market (where there is much less anonymity and the issue
of reputation may be important), they may behave differently than the blocks modeled in
this paper.
The model identifies several parameters of the environment that should influence the
asymmetry. While the trading intensity of institutional investors should affect the asym-
metry, identifying proxies for informed institutional investors may be far from trivial. The
number of institutional shareholders or the percentage holdings of a stock by institutions
can be very misleading proxies as they can hide many uninformed institutions (e.g., index
funds). It may be possible to identify νi, as well as the other parameters of the model,
without resorting to data beyond that contained in the sequence of trades. Easley, Kiefer
and O’Hara (1997a, 1997b) have developed a maximum likelihood estimation technique that
imposes similar structural trade models on signed trade data (buy and sell orders). The
parameters are identified solely on the basis of their implications vis-a-vis the trading pro-
cess. One clear advantage of this methodology is that no external proxies are being used.
However, if blocks do not trade frequently enough, estimation of the parameters using block
data alone may not be very precise.
Designing appropriate controls for the empirical analysis becomes an important issue if
mutual funds in the real world trade for various reasons not accounted for in the model. One
such reason may be the volatile flow of money into and out of funds (see Chevalier and Ellison
(1997); Del Guercio and Tkac (1998)). In the model, I assume that managers can always
search for information on stocks and find enough stocks with good information events (or
hold money). What if the inflow is so great as to overwhelm the research capabilities of an
institution, but portfolio managers still feel they must invest to show that they are doing their
job? What if the outflow is so severe that it requires selling stocks on which the institutional
investor discovers good information? Borrowing constraints will make the influence of flows
on the portfolios of mutual funds even more pronounced. Since empirical tests of the model
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should focus on the information-based part of the trading strategy of institutional investors,
controlling for inflows and outflows could help the investigation considerably.32 In addition,
it may be necessary to control for events that trigger intensive uninformed block trading
with a predominant direction. For example, changes to the composition of the S&P500 index
generate abnormal uninformed block trading by index funds. Excluding such events from
the analysis can reduce noise and strengthen the link between abnormal block trading and
the existence of private information.33
4 Conclusion
The existence of a permanent price impact asymmetry between buyer and seller-initiated
block transactions (and institutional trades) has been documented in the empirical literature
in finance. This paper contributes to this literature by developing a theoretical model to
explain and investigate the asymmetry phenomenon. The model is based on the premise
that the profit maximizing behavior of institutional investors creates a difference between the
information content of buys and sells. There are two driving forces behind the asymmetry
phenomenon. The first is the manner in which portfolio managers optimally use information
when they have the ability to search for private information about multiple stocks. The
second is a set of constraints on the allowable trading strategies of portfolio managers. Incor-
porating the dynamic trading strategy of mutual funds in a simple trading model allows for
the explicit derivation and investigation of the expected permanent price impact asymmetry.
A central implication of the model is that the history of price performance influences the
asymmetry. The longer the (abnormal) run-up in a stock’s price, the less is the asymmetry. In
fact, the model predicts no asymmetry or even negative asymmetry following very long price
run-ups. The greater the trading intensity of institutional investors, the more pronounced is
the asymmetry when the stock’s price has not been going up. The opposite result appears
32For a discussion of this point see Edelen (1998).
33Alternatively, one can use such events as an additional test of the model since block sells that are
associated with a deletion from the index and block buys that are associated with an addition to the index
need not exhibit the permanent price impact asymmetry.
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after a long period of price appreciation. Similarly, the more informationally-active a stock,
the greater is the asymmetry if the stock’s price has not been going up or is at the beginning
of a series of price appreciations. The opposite result appears after a long price run-up.
Greater dispersion of a stock’s price affects the asymmetry by increasing the influence of
the informational effect. It is hoped that the framework developed in this paper can aid
researchers who are planning empirical investigations of the asymmetry phenomenon or the
effects of institutional investors on financial markets in general.
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Appendix
Proof of Result 1: If the stock’s price did not go up substantially in the previous day, it
must be that the previous day was either a bad information or a no information event day.
Hence, q=0 which implies γit,q=0.
J it |q=0 = 2
Zit
V it−1
αiδi(1− δi)νi Ω
i
t
αi(1− δi)νiΩit + 12(1− νi)
+ 2ri > 0
Q.E.D
Proof of Result 2: Note that the only parameter affected by q is γit,q, which is monotonically
increasing in q. Hence, it suffices to show that J it is decreasing in γ
i
t,q.
∂J it
∂γit,q
= 2
Zit
V it−1
αiδi(1− δi)νi
[
−1
2
Ωit(1− γit,q)[
αi(1− δi)νiΩit(1− γit,q) + 12(1− νi)
]2
−
1
2
(1− νi)[
[1− αi(1− δi)]νiγit,q + 12(1− νi)
]2
]
< 0
Q.E.D
Proof of Result 3:
∂J it
∂νi
=
Zit
V it−1
[
Ωit(1− γit,q)[
αi(1− δi)νiΩit(1− γit,q) + 12(1− νi)
]2
− γ
i
t,q[
[1− αi(1− δi)]νiγit,q + 12(1− νi)
]2
]
(8)
For q = 0,
∂J it
∂νi
∣∣∣∣
q=0
=
Zit
V it−1
Ωit[
αi(1− δi)νiΩit + 12(1− νi)
]2 > 0 (9)
For q ≥ 1, the sign depends on the values of the other parameters. As q increases, the
second term of (8) begins to dominate and the expression becomes negative. In particular,
we can use infinity as an approximation for a large q to show that the expression will become
negative for all values of the other parameters (note that γit,q approaches one as q approaches
infinity as all institutions have already bought the stock after an infinite number of good
information event days).
lim
q→∞
∂J it
∂νi
= − Z
i
t
V it−1
1[
[1− αi(1− δi)]νi + 1
2
(1− νi)]2 < 0 (10)
Q.E.D
27
Proof of Result 4:
∂J it
∂αi
= 2
Zit
V it−1
δi(1− δi)νi
[
1
2
(1− νi)Ωit(1− γit,q)[
αi(1− δi)νiΩit(1− γit,q) + 12(1− νi)
]2
− (γ
i
t,q)
2νi + 1
2
(1− νi)γit,q[
[1− αi(1− δi)]νiγit,q + 12(1− νi)
]2
]
(11)
For q = 0,
∂J it
∂αi
∣∣∣∣
qit=0
= 2
Zit
V it−1
δi(1− δi)νi
[
1
2
(1− νi)Ωit[
αi(1− δi)νiΩit + 12(1− νi)
]2
]
> 0
For q ≥ 1, the sign depends on the values of the other parameters. As q increases, the second
term of (11) begins to dominate and the expression becomes negative. In particular, we
can use infinity as an approximation for a large q to show that the expression will become
negative for all values of the other parameters (note that γit,q approaches one as q approaches
infinity as all institutions have already bought the stock after an infinite number of good
information event days).
lim
q→∞
∂J it
∂αi
= 2
Zit
V it−1
δi(1− δi)νi
[
−
1
2
(1 + νi)[
[1− αi(1− δi)]νi + 1
2
(1− νi)]2
]
< 0
Q.E.D
Proof of Result 5: The dispersion of a stock’s price at any given date can be represented
by the range 2Z
i
t
V it−1
. It is clear from expression (7) that an increase in Z
i
t
V it−1
will intensify the
effect of the information term on the asymmetry expression. If this term is positive, greater
dispersion implies a more positive asymmetry expression. If this term is negative, greater
dispersion implies a less positive asymmetry expression.
Q.E.D
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Figure 1
This figure depicts the probabilities and trading outcomes for an arbitrary stock. αi is the
probability of an information event. δi is the probability of bad information and 1−δi is the
probability of good information. νi is the probability that an institutional investor arrives
to the market. γit,q is the probability that the institutional investor’s portfolio contains
the stock. Ωit is the probability that the institutional investor buys the stock on a good
information day if the stock is not in its portfolio.
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